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Abstract
Adversarial examples, which are slightly per-
turbed inputs generated with the aim of fooling
a neural network, are known to transfer between
models; adversaries which are effective on one
model will often fool another. This concept of
transferability poses grave security concerns as
it leads to the possibility of attacking models in
a black box setting, during which the internal pa-
rameters of the target model are unknown. In this
paper, we seek to analyze and minimize the trans-
ferability of adversaries between models within
an ensemble. To this end, we introduce a gradi-
ent based measure of how effectively an ensem-
ble’s constituent models collaborate to reduce the
space of adversarial examples targeting the en-
semble itself. Furthermore, we demonstrate that
this measure can be utilized during training as to
increase an ensemble’s robustness to adversarial
examples.
1. Introduction
Neural networks are known to be vulnerable to adversarial
examples, which are slightly perturbed images that yield a
misclassification. This phenomenon has been widely stud-
ied, yet the task of developing an effective defense against
such attacks is of significant difficulty (Carlini & Wagner,
2017). Most proposed defenses fall into two categories.
The first approach is to improve the training of networks
as to make them less vulnerable to adversarial examples,
employing methods such as adding noise to the training
set or conditioning the network on pre-perturbed inputs.
The second approach turns to detection; instead of attempt-
ing to correctly classify adversaries, detection methods
are content with simply flagging them. However, even
detection can be quite a complicated task, as shown by
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(Carlini & Wagner, 2017). Indeed, it seems that most de-
tection mechanisms can be circumvented if an adversary is
aware of its use.
In this paper, we strive to approach the problem using
ensembles instead of single models. The idea of us-
ing ensembles to increase robustness is not novel; this
has been explored by many, including (Tramer et al.,
2017), (Kariyappa & Qureshi, 2019), (Pang et al., 2019)
and (Bagnall et al., 2017). However, we are concerned less
with the actual production of robust ensembles, but rather
with the evaluation of such ensembles. More specifically,
we use a gradient-based approach to evaluate how effec-
tively the models within the ensemble collaborate to estab-
lish robustness against adversaries.
1.1. Contributions
The main contribution is the gradient diversity rating, a
new metric which measures the effectiveness of the collab-
oration amongst an ensemble’s constituent models against
adversarial attacks. The metric is obtained through a geo-
metric analysis of the misalignment of the ensemble’s mod-
els’ gradients. We demonstrate that one can use the rating
during training in order to produce ensembles with high
gradient misalignment (which are therefore harder to fool).
Ensembles with various gradient diversity ratings are then
attacked in order to support the theoretical work by estab-
lishing a correlation between the gradient diversity rating
and the ensemble’s robustness to adversarial attacks.
2. Background
Before exploring the theoretical development of the gradi-
ent diversity rating, the main contribution of this paper, we
first survey related work, and introduce important metrics
which serve as a motivation to the result.
2.1. Related Work
Adversarial examples in the context of DNNs have come
into the spotlight after Szegedy et al. showed the im-
perceptibility of the perturbations which could fool state-
of-the-art computer vision systems (Szegedy et al., 2014).
Since then, adversarial examples have been demonstrated
in many other domains, notably including speech recog-
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nition (Carlini & David, 2018), and malware detection
(Grosse et al., 2016). Nevertheless, CNNs in computer vi-
sion provide a convenient domain to explore adversarial at-
tacks and defenses due to the existence of standardized test
datasets, high performing CNN models reaching human or
super-human accuracy on clean data, and the marked deteri-
oration of their performance when subjected to adversarial
examples to which human vision is robust.
The intra-model and inter-model transferability of
adversarial examples was investigated thoroughly by
(Papernot et al., 2016). It was found that adversarial
examples created for fundamentally different MNIST
classification models could transfer between each other.
This showed that neural networks are not special in their
vulnerability, and that simply hiding model details from
an attacker is bound to fail since a substitute model can be
trained, whose adversarial examples are likely to transfer
to the hidden model.
Transferable adversarial examples pose a security risk
mainly if they are able to cause a misclassification of the
same class between models. Otherwise, a defender could
use the disagreement between two models with similar per-
formance as a way of detecting these adversaries. However,
a targeted attack on an ensemble of models significantly in-
creases the same-target transfer rate.
Training for diversity amongst ensembles as a defense is a
relatively new idea, but has been explored by (Pang et al.,
2019), (Bagnall et al., 2017) and (Kariyappa & Qureshi,
2019), for example. In particular, (Pang et al., 2019) in-
troduces diversity in ensembles by encouraging differing
prediction confidence amongst secondary outcome classes,
and (Kariyappa & Qureshi, 2019) uses the pairwise angle
of the model gradients to achieve diversity on adversaries.
However, none of the presented result thus far perform a
rigorous geometric analysis of the space of adversarial ex-
amples, a route which we explore here.
2.2. Metrics
Before delving into the concept of the gradient diversity rat-
ing, we introduce the two main metrics in use as to provide
some motivation to the presented result. The gradient di-
versity rating, as introduced in the next section, will serve
as a computable, measurable and practical estimate of an
ensemble’s collaboration rating, explained below.
2.2.1. ADVERSARIAL SUCCESS
First of the two important metrics is the adversarial suc-
cess, which corresponds the the portion of adversarial ex-
amples which successfully fool all models in the ensemble.
Since the aim of gradient diversity is to ensure that all mod-
els within the ensemble cannot be fooled in the same fash-
ion, we count the success rate of the adversarial attack as
the portion of examples which yielded the same incorrect
misclassification from all of the ensemble’s constituents.
Formally, this can be described as follows. Given a test set
T of inputs x with ground truth label yx such that all x are
correctly classified by all models f1, ...., fn in an ensem-
bles E , and an attack A which takes inputs x and perturbs
them to return some input x∗, we define
A(E ) =
|{x ∈ T s.t. f1(x
∗) = · · · = fn(x
∗) 6= yx}|
|T |
(1)
Additionally, we can define the adversarial success of an
attack against a particular model f , rather than an ensemble,
by simply taking E = {f}.
2.2.2. COLLABORATION RATING
The collaboration rating CR of E with respect to some at-
tack A is simply
CRA(E ) =
A(E )∏
f∈E A(f)
(2)
Intuitively, if the adversaries were randomly distributed
near the inputs, one would expect CRA(E ) ≈ 1. A low
collaboration rating means the space of adversarial exam-
ples with respect to each of the models does not largely
intersect; on the other hand, if an ensemble has a high col-
laboration rating, this denotes some alignment in the adver-
sarial spaces. Note that, in practice, this measure is largely
ineffective in a defense setting: it relies upon preexisting
knowledge of the nature of the attack being employed by
the adversary. However, it is useful in the theoretical setting
as it gives a measure of how the ensemble performs relative
to the individual models, effectively measuring the collab-
oration of the ensemble’s models, which is precisely what
the gradient diversity rating aims to evaluate. Intuitively,
one can think of the collaboration rating as the ground truth
corresponding to the ensemble’s effectiveness, which the
gradient diversity rating then seeks to minimize, regardless
of the employed attack.
3. Ensemble Gradient Diversity Rating
The following section contains the theoretical work at the
foundation of the presented ideas. In particular, we derive
the concept of an ensembles’s Gradient Diversity Rating
(GDR).
3.1. Definitions
Throughout, define x ∈ Rn to be an unperturbed im-
age with ground truth y (in a classification setting), f to
be some model outputting a predicted class, f c to be the
prediction confidence of class c (i.e. f(x) = c′ where
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f c
′
(x) = maxc f
c(x)), and ∇f(x) to be the gradient of
fy at x. Note this is the gradient of the model with respect
to the correct class, regardless of the model’s output itself.
3.2. Assumptions
Since this is a gradient based approach, we naturally rely
on the assumption that each of the models within the en-
sembles we discuss is approximately linear. Our approach
will work best if the following holds for (most) inputs x
and (small) perturbations v:
v · ∇f(x) < 0 if and only if fy(x+ v) < fy(x)
In other words, the prediction confidence increases in the
direction of the gradient, and decreases in the negative di-
rection of the gradient. This condition need only hold for
most inputs and reasonable perturbations; the above crite-
rion is not a categorical determinant of our approach’s va-
lidity. Nonetheless, the theory developed in support of the
approach does rely upon this assumption. Call this assump-
tion the linearity assumption.
3.3. Theoretical Development
We denote an adversary by x∗ = x + v for some small
v with ‖v‖ ≤ ǫ given a norm and ǫ > 0 (for example, in
the case of MNIST, |v| ≤ 0.3 by convention). Importantly,
note that no assumptions are made on how this adversary is
reached; regardless of the employed adversarial attack, one
will always be able to express the adversary in the above
form. Therefore, since the following reasoning does not
rely upon knowledge of the attack method, it generalizes to
any adversarial attack. Near x, if v projects negatively on
∇f(x), it will reduce the projection confidence of fy (as
a result of the linearity assumption), and is therefore more
likely to generate an adversarial example on for f at x. Con-
sidering now an ensemble of models E = {f1, · · · , fi}, we
formulate the following condition:
Diversity Condition: For all unperturbed images x, there
does not exist a perturbation v such that v · ∇f(x) < 0 for
all models f ∈ E simultaneously.
Indeed, if we can guarantee this condition, we ensure no
perturbation can simultaneously lower the prediction confi-
dence of all models.
The diversity condition can be rephrased in terms of the
adversarial subspaces of each model at x. Define
Advx(f) = {x
∗ = x+ v s.t. ||v|| ≤ ǫ, f(x∗) 6= y} (3)
Advx(f) is the set of all potential adversaries at x against
f . The diversity condition strives to minimize the size of⋂
f∈E Advx(f), for all unperturbed x. Note that the lin-
earity assumption allows us to claim that for most x∗ =
x + v ∈ Advx(f), we have v · ∇f(x) < 0, thereby estab-
lishing the link between the gradients of the models and the
adversaries.
We now progress towards a method to assess the size of the
shared adversarial subspace between each of the models in
the ensemble. For a given unperturbed input x and model
f , define the half space
Hfx = {v ∈ R
n s.t. v · ∇f(x) < 0} (4)
This space, which can be geometricaly described as the half
space below the hyperplane naturally oriented by ∇f(x),
consists of all possible perturbations that would locally
reduce the ground truth prediction confidence of f at x.
Given an ensemble E , we may now consider the convex
cone
C(E )x =
⋂
f∈E
Hfx (5)
C(E )x contains all possible perturbations which would
project negatively onto all of the gradients at x of the mod-
els in the ensemble. However, only perturbations with rela-
tively small magnitude are of interest; indeed, the perturba-
tions must be small enough to maintain the ground truth of
x. Therefore, we turn our attention to C(E )x relative to a
unit sphere centered at x. To this end, viewing Sn−1 ⊂ Rn,
define ∆Ex = S
n−1 ∩ C(E )x. This is a spherical poly-
tope containing all directions which simultaneously lower
the prediction confidence of all models within the ensem-
ble (see figure (3.3)). This points to the importance of the
size of∆Ex.
In order to formalize the concept of size in this case, note
first that∆Ex is an n−1 dimensional manifold with bound-
ary, which can be viewed as a submanifold of Sn−1. There-
fore, we establish the following rating
R(E , x) =
Voln−1(∆Ex)
Voln−1(Sn−1)
(6)
Where Voln−1 denotes n−1 dimensional volume, as given
by the sphere’s volume form. Intuitively, R evaluates the
portion of directions which project negatively onto all the
gradients of each model in E at x. In order to obtain a more
global metric of the model, we average this rating over all
inputs within a test set S. This culminates in the definition
of the ensemble’s gradient diversity rating (GDR):
GDR(E ) =
1
|S|
∑
x∈S
R(E , x) (7)
A high GDR corresponds to a large portion of directions
projecting negatively onto the gradients, and therefore a
weaker ensemble. An optimal ensemble has GDR = 0. We
hypothesize that this rating directly correlates with the size
of the intersection of the adversarial subspaces of all mod-
els within the ensemble, and therefore with the adversarial
robustness of the ensemble.
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∇f1(x)
∇f2(x)
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H(f1)x ∩H(f2)x
Figure 1. A visualization of∆Ex in an ensemble with two models,
projected onto the span of the gradients.
3.4. Analysis of the GDR
It is worth exploring in more depth how the GDR ought to
be interpreted. Indeed, it is tempting to hypothesize that,
simply because some ensemble A may have a lower GDR
than some other ensemble B, ensemble A will be more re-
sistant to adversarial attacks; this is not necessarily the case.
For example, consider the case when ensemble A consists
of three standard models trained without gradient regular-
ization, and B consists of three copies of a single model
which received significant individual adversarial training.
The GDR of A expected to be around 1
23
, and that of B
is 0.5 (See Section 4.1 for the derivation of these values);
however, it would not be surprising for ensemble B to per-
form better, despite its higher GDR.
Another intriguing example is as follows: consider an en-
semble consisting of as many models as output classes,
with model fi always returning class i. While this ensem-
ble will have consensus accuracy 0, no adversary will be
able to simultaneously fool all of the constituting models,
since there will always be a model outputting the correct
class. Furthermore, the GDR itself will be 0 as no perturba-
tion will project negatively onto all the gradients, since the
gradients themselves will be 0. However, despite the GDR
being optimal, this is by no means an effective ensemble.
An ensemble’s GDR is therefore better interpreted as a mea-
sure of how effectively the models within the ensemble col-
laborate when faced with adversarial examples. Conse-
quentially, the GDR must always be placed in context for
it to retain significance (just as a classifier’s accuracy must
be placed in context of any potential class imbalance, for
example). Effective collaboration is trivial when the col-
laborating models themselves are ineffective. Such context
might include, for example, a given ensemble E ’s GDR rel-
ative to 1
2|E |
, relative to that of another ensemble with sim-
ilar architecture, or relative to the adversarial robustness of
the constituent models (as in the collaboration rating, estab-
lished in Section 2.2.2).
4. Calculating an Ensemble’s GDR
Evaluating an ensemble’s GDR may not be as straightfor-
ward as one might initially anticipate. Indeed, evaluating
R(E , x) is analogous to evaluating a solid angle in |E | di-
mensions, a problem which is known to be hard in higher
dimensions (Ribando, 2006). Therefore, we treat this prob-
lem case by case, depending on the size of the ensemble.
Note that, throughout, we assume there are no linear depen-
dences amongst gradients of the models, unless otherwise
specified (this is not a costly assumption).
4.1. |E | = 1 and other (almost) trivial cases
Trivially, when |E | = 1, we have R(E , x) = 0.5 for any x,
as there is only one gradient given, upon which exactly half
of all perturbations project negatively. Therefore, in such
cases, GDR(E ) = 0.5. Similarly, regardless of |E |, if all
models in the ensemble have the same gradient at all points,
we will have GDR(E ) = 0.5 for the same reason. This con-
firms the intuition that an ensemble consisting of several
copies of the same model has weak collaboration against
adversaries (as one would expect), since any successful ad-
versarial example on one model will transfer onto all oth-
ers trivially. Furthermore, it is worth noting that, since any
two randomly initiated models are likely to have roughly
orthogonal gradients, an ensemble E with |E | = i consist-
ing of independently trained models would be expected to
have GDR(E ) ≈ 1
2i
.
4.2. |E | = 2
Given E = {f1, f2} and an unperturbed image x,
any potential perturbation v can be projected first onto
span(∇f1(x),∇f2(x)); from there, it can then be decided
if v projects negatively onto both gradients. From this, it
becomes geometrically clear that
R(E , x) =
1
2π
(
π − arccos
(
∇f1(x) · ∇f2(x)
))
(8)
This term is easy to compute, meaning it can be incor-
porated during training of the ensemble to ensure gra-
dient diversity. Note this has already been done in
(Kariyappa & Qureshi, 2019) by minimizing the pairwise
cosine similarity between gradients. However, this ap-
proach may not be optimal when |E | ≥ 2, as assumed
by (Kariyappa & Qureshi, 2019). This is for two main rea-
sons. First, this approach forces the gradients towards a
unique geometrical layout (an |E | − 1 dimensional regular
simplex), which adds unnecessary geometrical complica-
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tions during training. Second, as |E | gets larger, this ap-
proach becomes equivalent to demanding that the gradients
be pairwise orthogonal which, as previously discussed, is
equivalent to simply training the models individually, with
no gradient term.
4.3. |E | = 3
As with the previous case, we begin by projecting any po-
tential perturbation onto span(∇f1(x),∇f2(x),∇f3(x)).
This case then reduces to finding the (2-dimensional) vol-
ume a spherical triangle. Alternatively, one can observe
that the optimal gradient layout is reached if and only if
the sum of the pairwise angles between the gradients is 2π.
Either of these approaches can be utilized to train an ensem-
ble of three models to ensure gradient diversity.
4.4. |E | = 4
This case is treated in an almost identical method as the pre-
vious one. Indeed, after projecting on the space spanned by
each of the gradients, one notes that this problem is equiv-
alent to finding the volume of a spherical tetrahedron, the
volume of which is hard to evaluate directly. Therefore,
just as it was possible to find the sum of the pairwise an-
gles between gradients when |E | = 3, we can perceive this
problem as maximizing the sum of the areas of the spheri-
cal triangles between every three of the four gradients. Ge-
ometrically, it becomes clear that the maximum is reached
when this sum is 4π, the surface area of a sphere. This
approach is much more computationally feasible, and can
therefore be incorporated during training.
4.5. |E | ≥ 5
When |E | ≥ 5, R(E , x) becomes hard to evaluate as there
is no direct method of computing the volume of higher di-
mensional spherical polytopes (on spheres Sn with n ≥ 3).
Indeed, the best method to obtain an exact measure of a
higher dimensional solid angle calls upon a multivariate
Taylor Series (Ribando, 2006). In order to circumvent this
problem, we can re-express the functionR as
R(E , x) =
∫
Sn−1
∏
f∈E
H(−v · ∇f(x)) dv (9)
with H denoting the Heaviside step function and the inte-
gral ranging over the hypersphere, with the integrand val-
ued at 1 if v ∈ Sn−1 projects negatively onto each of the
gradients simultaneously, and 0 otherwise. The fact that
this does indeed yield the value of R is immediate. The
advantage of viewing the problem in such a way is that
it may now be estimated with a simple Monte Carlo ap-
proach, regardless of the size of the ensemble (generating
a uniform random distribution on the n-sphere requires a
quick trick (Tian et al., 2016)). Averaging these estima-
tions over a test set will give an approximation to the en-
semble’s GDR. While this is unlikely to be useful during
training, it remains an important metric of any ensemble.
Alternatively, it is indirectly demonstrated by
(Kariyappa & Qureshi, 2019) that simpler training
methods can be utilized to minimize the GDR without
directly computing it. This yields an import circumvention
the above problem, and allows for gradient training in
ensembles of arbitrary size (although the gradient loss
terms may not be optimal).
5. Ensemble Training with GDR
Minimization
As previously mentioned, one can use an ensemble’s GDR
during training to reduce the size of the adversarial space
effective on all models simultaneously. Implementations of
such methods usually will train all models in the ensemble
simultaneously, utilizing a loss function of the following
form:
Loss = Image Loss+ β(Gradient Loss) (10)
The image loss term depends simply on the accuracy of
the ensemble (i.e. average cross entropy loss over con-
stituent models) and the gradient loss term consists of some
method, such as those outlined in the previous section,
which strives to minimize the ensemble’s GDR. β is a hy-
perparameter which varies upon the previous two terms,
and which is best determined through experimentation. In
this section, the above method is employed to create sev-
eral ensembles with varying GDR, which are then tested
against various attacks. The aim of this experiment is to
demonstrate a correlation between an ensemble’s GDR and
the robustness of the ensemble to adversarial attacks.
5.1. Experimental Design
In order to train ensembles with varying GDR, we em-
ployed the aforementioned method. This then allows us
to carry attacks on a wide range of ensembles and compare
their resistance with respect to their GDR.
On MNIST, we trained 5 ensembles, each consisting of
three individual models. The first three ensembles are
trained for 15 epochs with a gradient loss term which mini-
mizes the maximum pairwise cosine similarity of the gradi-
ents, then 15 epochs with a gradient loss term which maxi-
mizes the sum of the pairwise angles of the gradients. The
final two ensembles are trained for 30 epochs without any
gradient regularization. Additional ensembles are formed
by recombining the individual models from these five origi-
nal ensembles. This exact process is replicated on Fashion-
MNIST. The effectiveness of this training is apparent from
figure (2). All ensembles reached ensemble consensus ac-
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curacy> 0.98 and > 0.82 for MNIST and FashionMNIST,
respectively. The ensembles are subjected to three white-
box attacks: the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM), the
Linf Projective Gradient Descent (LinfPGD) and the Mo-
mentum Iterative (MI) attacks.
5.2. Results
The results of the above experiment are displayed in fig-
ure (3). The first clear observation is that ensembles with
lower GDR do indeed tend to have lower attack success
and collaboration ratings, as predicted by the theoretical
development of the metric. The LinfPGD attack was very
effective, both against individual models and ensembles; as
a result, the trends are much more apparent for low ǫ values
as high ǫ values resulted in high attack success rates, regard-
less of the gradient training. Furthermore, due to limits in
computing power, both the LinfPGD and MI attacks were
conducted on a mere 500 images (in contrast to the 10,000
images which we perturbed by FGSM). This may explain
the high variance in the latter two attacks.
6. Conclusion
The primary result of this paper is the gradient diversity
rating (GDR). In particular, the GDR metric provides a
direct indication of the collaboration strength between to
constituent models of an ensemble, and can demonstrably
be used during training to create more robust ensembles.
Early experimentation suggests that, as expected, an ensem-
ble with a lower GDR is less vulnerable to attacks fooling
all of its constituting models. However, there is much room
left for improvements and clarification. Interesting topics
to explore could include the analysis of GDR on ensembles
consisting of models with individual adversarial training,
methods to improve attacks against ensembles with gradi-
ent diversity training, and improvements to the GDRmetric
to yield a more absolute, comparable measure of the ensem-
ble’s effectiveness, perhaps by introducing terms related to
model accuracy or number of output classes.
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Figure 2. Histogram of R(E , x) for 1000 images on 3 different ensembles: one with gradient training, one without, and one consisting
of two models from an ensemble with gradient training, and a third from one without. The first row consists of the MNIST ensembles,
and the second of the FashionMNIST ensembles. This demonstrates that the GDR training methods are effectively reducing the GDR
(see equation (7)).
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Figure 3. Performance of the MNIST (top) and FashionMNIST (bottom) ensembles against three attacks (FGSM, LinfPGD, MI). The
attack success corresponds to the portion of adversaries which successfully fooled the ensembles. The collaboration rating denotes
the performance of the model relative to its constituent models, as defined by equation (2). The red points denote the average of the
ensembles with the same composition. The ensembles’ GDR is recorded along the x-axis. Note the overall positive trend, which suggest
that a low GDR does indeed result in a more robust ensemble, as predicted by the theoretical development of the metric.
